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Until the mid-2000s, territorial politics played a considerable role in both Italy and Spain. Two 
regionalist parties, among others, clearly contributed to this: Democratic Convergence of 
Catalonia (CDC) and the Northern League. Yet evidence shows that the two parties, while 
starting from relatively similar positions, have followed diverging trajectories, particularly 
after the financial (and then economic) crisis that hit their respective countries. CDC pushed 
its pro-autonomy stances to the extreme and eventually ended up supporting Catalan 
independence. On the other hand, the League dropped its regionalist agenda and even became 
a state-wide party. By comparing these two cases, this article aims to shed light on the 
mechanisms that lead to the radicalisation or moderation (and even abandonment) of regionalist 
parties’ territorial demands. These opposite movements have broader implications, since they 
have been accompanied by increasing polarisation of territorial politics in Spain and the de-
politicisation of this issue in Italy. 






For most of the 1990s and early 2000s, Italy and Spain were regarded as the two main European 
countries where territorial issues had come to play an important role in shaping national and 
sub-national politics. They both experienced the rise of strong regionalist and sub-state 
nationalist parties (De Winter and Türsan 1998) and underwent a significant process of 
institutional regionalisation (Keating 2009). Although pro-independence movements were not 
completely absent, demands coming from most regionalist parties were aimed at achieving 
increasing institutional autonomy, rather than full independence. In sum, both countries were 
characterised by significant elements of territorial dynamism, which, however, did not seem to 
seriously destabilise political and institutional equilibria.   
Two regionalist parties played a particularly important role in these two contexts. In Italy, the 
Northern League (LN) advocated increasing autonomy for northern Italy and was particularly 
strong in Lombardy and Veneto, the two richest and most populous regions of the North. In the 
late 1990s this party even campaigned for the full independence of this part of the country 
(Diamanti and Donaldson 1997) but then returned to its original support for more moderate 
forms of devolution at the beginning of the 21st century. In Spain, Catalonia was by far the 
largest region with significant territorial mobilisation. Here, Democratic Convergence of 
Catalonia (CDC)1, which was included in the electoral alliance Convergence and Union (CiU), 
dominated the pro-autonomy camp. Apart from the short secessionist parenthesis of the LN, 
both parties were clearly supportive of increasing institutional decentralisation in their 
respective countries, without questioning national unity.  
Yet, since the late 2000s, the trajectories of these two political actors have diverged 
considerably, even though Italy and Spain seemed to face similar challenges during and in the 
aftermath of the Great Recession. While the LN dropped most of its pro-autonomy and 
federalist agenda and transformed into a state-wide party, CDC moved in the opposite 
direction, increasing its territorial demands and eventually supporting Catalan independence. 
The questions that this article aims to address are: Why has this occurred? What are the 
mechanisms that have led to these opposite outcomes? 
Answering these questions is particularly relevant because it can provide important insights 
into more general transformations in the political systems of both countries. Indeed, while in 
                                                          




Spain we can observe an exacerbation of centre-periphery tensions since 2008, in Italy the 
federalist and regionalist agenda has been significantly de-politicised and has almost 
completely disappeared from the political debate in the same period. 
In this study we explain the divergence outlined above by looking at how contextual socio-
economic and political factors have impacted on the strategies pursued by two important 
regionalist parties. Italy and Spain allow a systematic comparison of ‘most similar systems’ 
(Della Porta 2008: 214-217) and this offers a unique opportunity, so far surprisingly ignored 
by the literature, to identify factors leading to a radicalisation or de-radicalisation of territorial 
political demands.   
In this article we first show that the League and CDC have moved in opposite directions, 
starting from very similar territorial stances in the 1990s. Then we develop a theoretical 
framework aimed at explaining the two different outcomes by linking changes in socio-
economic and political contexts to the adjustments made by the two regionalist parties under 
their ‘transformative’ leaders. Based on this framework, our empirical analysis traces the 
diverging paths towards radicalisation or moderation of territorial mobilisation by considering 
the role played by both structural factors and political agency. In the conclusion we stress that 
assessing the evolution of the two parties is important if we want to fully appreciate the striking 
differences between Italy and Spain in the salience and polarisation of centre-periphery 
relations after the crisis. We also suggest that the framework presented in this study can be 
applied to other cases to understand how and why regionalist parties (but also state-wide ones) 
change their political stances on the territorial dimension. 
 
Northern League and Democratic Convergence of Catalonia before and after the crisis 
Until recent years two parties played a key role in the autonomist camp of Italy and Spain: the 
LN and CDC. The first of these became successful in the early 1990s thanks to a confluence 
of various regional movements representing the Italian North (Biorcio 2017: 135), among 
which the Lombard League was the largest one. The second was the major partner of an 
electoral coalition and later party federation called Convergence and Union (CiU), which was 
created in the late 1970s and was, by far, the largest regionalist group of Spain.2 CDC was 
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defined as a ‘moderate regionalist’ party (Barberà and Barrio 2017) advocating more self-
government for Catalonia and emphasising economic and political grievances against Madrid, 
while downplaying its ‘ethnic appeal’ (Ibid.: 69). The LN was very similar in this respect. Like 
CDC, this party represented one of the richest areas of the country and, therefore, accused 
Rome, and the South more generally, of ‘exploiting’ the North. Generally, both parties focused 
on the territorial allocation of financial resources between centre and periphery. In both cases, 
central governments were accused of taking away resources from productive regions to 
redistribute them to less productive ones.   
Therefore it is not surprising that LN and CDC (as part of CiU) used to be equally supportive 
of decentralisation. Figure 1 shows how their positions on the territorial organisation of their 
respective countries have changed from the 1990s to the 2010s. This is based on data from the 
Comparative Manifesto Project (Volkens et al. 2018), which refer to the relative share of 
statements (quasi-sentences) supporting decentralisation/federalism in relation to all statements 
in the party manifesto.3 The number can range from 0 to 100 and a higher share indicates a 
more marked preference for transferring authority from the centre to the regions.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
What is striking is the increasing divergence between the two parties, which became clearly 
evident in the post-crisis period (in the 2010s). In the 1990s the League and CDC were almost 
identically positioned on the centre-periphery political dimension but then followed trajectories 
that are basically symmetrical. Whereas the former has abandoned most of its pro-federalist 
agenda (Albertazzi, Giovannini and Seddone 2018), the latter has placed even more emphasis 
on territorial issues and eventually adopted pro-independence positions. The Northern League 
became the League, dropping any specific reference to the North in its logo and becoming a 
key member of the growing family of right-wing national populists (Vampa 2017). On the other 
hand, the moderate CiU was disbanded and CDC ran in several pro-independence electoral 
coalitions, while re-founding itself as an explicitly independentist party (Colomer 2017: 964).  
As highlighted by Elias, Szöcsik and Zuber (2015: 844), parties ‘choose not only which 
dimensions to compete on (positioning), but also how much emphasis they place on each 
dimension (selective emphasis)’. Using their framework, we can say that CDC reinforced its 
‘unidimensional’ strategy, focusing on territoriality and radicalising its position on this 
                                                          
3 ‘Support for federalism/decentralisation’ is measured by calculating the difference between category 301 




dimension. On the other hand, the LN not only moderated its position on the territorial 
dimension but also ‘blurred’ it, while placing new emphasis and radicalising on the libertarian-
authoritarian dimension, which is key for populist radical right parties (De Lange 2007).  
Why has this happened? The contexts in which the two parties operated were not so different 
after all. Both Italy and Spain experienced a deep economic crisis in the post-2008 years, which 
resulted in an equally serious political crisis. Many citizens were disillusioned with the 
mainstream consensus embraced by both government and opposition, and voted instead for 
alternative parties (Hernández and Kriesi 2016; Hobolt and Tilley 2016).  The elections in Italy 
and Spain since 2008 provide a clear picture of how radically political dynamics in the two 
largest countries of Southern Europe changed in a short period of time. In the Spanish party 
system, which used to be among the most stable and least fragmented in Europe, combined 
support for the two mainstream (left and right) parties declined progressively from 84% in 2008 
to 45% at the April 2019 election, recovering slightly to 49% at the November 2019 electoral 
repeat. In Italy the collapse was similar in size over roughly the same time period: from 70% 
in 2008 to 33% in 2018.  
In sum, in a period of great economic uncertainty, both political systems were under significant 
pressure. They were both characterised by high levels of electoral fluidity, with the rise of new 
challenger parties. Yet this apparently similar set of conditions did not trigger similar responses 
from the League and CDC. In order to solve this puzzle, we need to develop a framework which 
allows a systematic empirical analysis of the two case studies. We should start from the ‘shock’ 
of the crisis and then move along the chain of structural transformations and agents’ responses 
which have determined a radical re-orientation of once relatively similar territorial agendas.  
 
Linking the external shock to changing party positions on the territorial dimension  
The two main regionalist parties of Italy and Spain have clearly redefined their priorities in the 
post-crisis period. Yet this change has not occurred in a vacuum. We argue that their shifts on 
the territorial dimension of political competition have been driven by ‘medium-term’ changes 
within the political opportunity structures (Kitschelt 1986), which have also interacted with 
leadership agency and intra-party dynamics. 
Figure 2 shows the hypothesised causal chain leading to the current reconfiguration of party 




economic changes that occurred as a consequence of the financial and economic crisis started 
in 2007 (stage 1). We argue that the effects of the exogenous shock, combined with domestic 
economic trends that started in the pre-crisis period (A), resulted in a change in the medium-
term political opportunity structures (stage 2), which include: the characteristics and 
ideological position of competitors in the party system, the degree of convergence between the 
mainstream parties and the coalition format in the respective party systems (Arzheimer and 
Carter 2006: 423). More generally, the Great Recession was not only an economic crisis but 
also had significant political implications (Hutter and Kriesi 2019). Economic hardship, and its 
social consequences, prompted voters to move away from incumbents and try to find new 
political alternatives (Casal Bertoa 2014: 5). This de-alignment was accompanied by a 
redefinition of patterns of political competition and the rise of new parties and movements 
campaigning against the political establishment and for a regeneration of democracy 
(Scantamburlo, Alonso and Gómez 2018: 615). When the crisis hit, the League and CDC were 
regarded as an integral part of the pre-existing political system (Scantamburlo, Alonso and 
Gómez 2018: 637). Therefore, like other established parties, they had to develop strategies to 
respond to the challenges posed by the changing political environment. Of course, the fractures 
that emerged after the crisis were not completely new. Some had deeper roots and were 
connected to pre-crisis trends and legacies at national and subnational levels (B). Therefore the 
crisis might have led to an acceleration of pre-existing processes of political de-/realignment 
and party system change (Hernández and Kriesi 2016: 204).  
Our analysis, however, focuses on particular aspects of the socio-economic and political 
contexts. As we mentioned in the previous section, at first Italy and Spain seem to have 
experienced similar economic and political shocks. Yet, since in this study we want to 
understand why two regionalist parties have diverged so much in their approach to autonomy 
and federalism, our focus is on the territorial consequences of the socio-economic and political 
crises. Therefore, we consider how regional finances and fiscal relations between centre and 
periphery were affected by the economic storm (stage 1) and how new political actors, which 
emerged in the aftermath of the Great Recession, approached the centre-periphery cleavage 
(stage 2). By looking at these two specific aspects, we show that there are clear differences 
between the two cases, which may in turn help us explain the diverging outcomes.  
The political transformations that occurred after the Great Recession clearly constituted a 




(individual personalities or groups) may play a key role as ‘agents’ of change (stage 3). Political 
‘entrepreneurs’ – those ‘individuals who change the direction and flow of politics’ (Schneider 
and Teske 1992: 737) – can use the opportunities (or challenges) provided by a restructuring 
political system to emphasise or de-emphasise some issues and recalibrate the long-term 
priorities and strategies of the organisations they lead. In some cases they can do so by drawing 
on organisational and programmatic legacies or accelerating processes of internal reform that 
may have already started (but did not fully unfold) before the crisis (C). Again, the focus is on 
how party leaders re-interpreted the territorial dimension of politics, since it is on this 
dimension that we observe a clear divergence between CDC and the League.  
[Figure 2] 
 
The last step of Figure 2 is the outcome (4), that is, the change in party positions on the 
territorial dimension and the emphasis they place on it (see Elias, Szöcsik and Zuber 2018, 
mentioned above). We have already discussed this outcome in the previous section describing 
the transformation of CDC and LN. By focusing on steps 1, 2 and 3 in Figure 2, we can explain 
this transformation. This is what we are doing in the next three sections. In the conclusion we 
also discuss the existence of a possible feedback effect (the arrow moving back from stage 4 
to stage 2 in Figure 2). Indeed, the repositioning of the two parties might in turn have 
contributed to reshaping the structure of political competition in the two countries.  
 
Stage 1. The economic crisis in Italy and Spain 
The economies of both Italy and Spain suffered significantly, but not in the same way, in the 
period that followed the 2007 financial shock. When the Great Recession hit Italy, the country 
was already in a rather delicate economic position, with low levels of economic growth and a 
very high debt/GDP ratio. The crisis contributed to the worsening of this situation, although 
Italian governments managed to limit the increase in yearly budget deficits and unemployment 
remained in line with that of the Eurozone (which in the post-2008 period was on average 
above 10%, so at relatively high levels). Spain instead started from a much better position, with 
a pre-crisis period characterised by sustained economic growth (well above the Eurozone 
average) and a healthy financial outlook (even running budget surpluses). However, the 




the post-crisis period. Generally it is true that the short-term consequences of the crisis were 
serious in both countries. Yet the change, and the consequent adjustment required, seemed 
more dramatic in the Spanish case. 
Indeed, as a consequence of a rapidly deteriorating financial situation in Spain, concerns grew 
over Spanish regional budgets in particular from 2010. Spain’s regional governments manage 
more than a third of state expenditure (Castells 2014: 281), but many remained reluctant to 
reduce spending once the Spanish government had started to implement austerity measures. 
The combination of extensive devolved spending powers and a primarily centralised revenue-
raising system, which applies to 15 of Spain’s regions under the common financing system (all 
except the Basque Country and Navarre), is a well-known risk for weakening fiscal discipline 
(Rodden 2005), and yet the situation was more complex than this. The regions faced a tougher 
task than the central government to trim their budgets since around two thirds of their spending 
is on the fundamental policy areas of health, education and social services. These were far 
harder to control demand for and cut than areas being slashed at the time by the central 
government, such as public investment in infrastructure, civil servants’ salaries and the foreign 
office budget (Gray 2014).  
Italian regions, on the other hand, despite facing challenges associated with the negative effects 
of the recession (lower revenues, worsening social conditions), did not experience the same 
level of pressure in a short period of time. Indeed, Italy started to enforce fiscal discipline much 
earlier and focused on the containment of budget deficits before the beginning of the financial 
crisis to reduce its historically high national debt, which had significantly increased in the 
1980s and 1990s.  
Figure 3 summarises the pre-crisis (2000-2007) and post-crisis (2008-2015) fiscal situation in 
Italian and Spanish regions. The difference between spending and revenues, measuring 
surplus/deficit, is calculated as a percentage of the revenues received by a region in a given 
year (Asatryan Feld and Geys 2015). Higher scores mean that the region is overspending (i.e. 
deficit is higher). Interestingly, Italian regional deficits did not increase substantially after the 
crisis. In fact, in the two core regions of northern Italy, which are also the LN’s strongholds, 
deficits even declined (Lombardy) or turned into surpluses (Veneto) after 2008. This situation 
of relative stability may have contributed to containing territorial conflicts over the distribution 
of resources, thus reducing the saliency of the centre-periphery cleavage. On the other hand, 




Catalonia was among the regions most seriously affected by the financial storm. Consequently, 
it also became one of the regions most dependent on loans from the central Spanish government 
from 2012 onwards, once it had lost access to alternative sources of financing (Gray 2014: 35-
38). In return, it had to adhere to a strict adjustment programme set by the Spanish government, 
as part of the latter’s efforts to meet the deficit targets set by the EU for Spain overall. This 
intensified longstanding Spanish-Catalan government tensions over the redistribution 
mechanisms inherent in the regional financing system (Gray 2014; 2016).  
[Figure 3] 
In sum, in a context of general economic depression, the discrepancy between pre- and post-
crisis economic and financial trends was much more marked in Spain than in Italy. As a result, 
several Spanish regions, in particular Catalonia, were also subject to much more pressure than 
Italian ones. The worsening economic situation in turn had an impact on patterns of party 
competition, acting as a catalyst for processes of political de-/realignment already underway, 
as shown in the next section. 
 
 
Stage 2. Changing political opportunity structures  
The Italian political scenario during the Great Recession was characterised by the crisis of the 
established party system and the rise of a new important political actor, the 5 Star Movement 
(M5S). Verbeek, Zaslove and Rooduijn (2018) provide an account of how the ‘meta-structure’ 
of party competition changed as a consequence of the crisis and emergence of a new populist 
actor. In the 1990s and 2000s, after the rise of the LN and the establishment of Berlusconi’s 
Forza Italia, a ‘bipolar’ party system with two alternating centre-left and centre-right coalitions 
emerged. The LN also acted as a populist political force linking an ‘us versus them’ political 
discourse to campaigns supporting increasing autonomy (and even independence) for the 
wealthy regions of the North. The regionalist populism of the League forged an alliance with 
the neoliberal populism of Berlusconi. By becoming a key player in the centre-right political 
coalition, the League was able to promote regionalism and federalism as a central issue in the 
political agenda.4 Yet, at the same time, the alternation between centre-left and centre-right 
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turned both alliances into established elites, which, in a context of economic uncertainty, 
created opportunities for a new wave of populism represented by the M5S.  
In contrast, in Spain, CDC, as lead party of the Catalan nationalist federation CiU, never 
became a permanent part of a state-wide party alliance. Rather, its relationship with state-wide 
parties – and, in turn, the importance granted to the territorial question in state-level politics – 
waxed and waned throughout the 1990s and 2000s depending in large part on whether the party 
governing Spain had an absolute majority of seats in the Spanish parliament or not. On 
occasions where the governing party, be it the People’s Party (PP) or the Socialist Party 
(PSOE), fell short of an absolute majority, it would seek support from regionally-based parties 
in return for decentralisation gains (and/or support in the regional parliament where necessary) 
via ‘mutual backscratching’ arrangements (Field 2014). Such deals gave the Catalan 
nationalists’ extensive leverage over the Spanish government at certain times, but left them 
with little-to-no leverage when the PP government had an absolute majority in 2000-2004 and 
again in 2011-2016, during which periods the PP’s centralist vision came to the fore. Many 
within CDC see the origins of the party’s later turn to a pro-sovereignty agenda in the first 
absolute majority Spanish PP government of Aznar in 2000-2004, which marked the 
beginnings of a reassertion of the Spanish nationalist vision of ‘one nation’ and a move towards 
recentralisation.5 
Moreover, it became increasingly difficult, for both ideological and strategic reasons, for 
Catalan nationalists to support PP minority governments – or indeed rely on the PP’s support 
back home in the Catalan parliament – following an increase in left-right political polarisation 
that took place under the Socialist governments of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero from 2004 
onwards. From Zapatero’s first mandate (2004-2008), a period described by Encarnación 
(2009) as marking ‘Spain’s New Left Turn’, the left-right divide in Spain became markedly 
more entrenched, as the PP reacted against several measures taken by the Socialists in quick 
succession to reform policies and institutional arrangements that had been in place since 
Spain’s transition to democracy. In Spain, the left-right axis of competition incorporates the 
centre-periphery axis, with left- and right-wing ideologies among state-wide parties long 
associated with decentralist and centralist positions, respectively (Dinas 2012). Thus, one of 
the ‘new-left’ policies of Zapatero that the Spanish right vehemently opposed was his decision 
                                                          




to revise and update the regional statutes of several autonomous communities and devolve 
further powers to some of them (Muro 2009).  
In practice, Zapatero faced immense challenges throughout the process, due in large part to 
regions with strong nationalist movements presenting statute reform proposals that were 
rejected by the Spanish parliament and/or Constitutional Court. In the Catalan case, the initial 
watering down of the Catalan parliament’s draft statute in order to secure Spanish 
parliamentary approval in 2006, which served to reduce the greater fiscal devolution the region 
sought (Gray 2016: 215-224), was followed later by a 2010 Spanish Constitutional Court ruling 
that declared totally or partly unconstitutional several articles of the new Catalan statute. This 
was the result of various appeals, some lodged by the PP, against aspects of the statute 
considered by critics as unconstitutional. The politics of the statute reform process (Muro 2009, 
Keating and Wilson 2009) led to increasingly polarised dynamics between pro-Spain and pro-
Catalonia parties – far more so than in the Basque case, due to circumstances specific to that 
region. This polarisation was exacerbated further by the outbidding process whereby the two 
Catalan regionalist-nationalist parties, CDC and the Republican Left (ERC), sought to outdo 
each other with more territorial ambitious proposals during the statute reform process and 
beyond (Barrio and Rodríguez-Teruel 2017; see also Stage 3). 
These differences in the Italian and Spanish cases have contributed, in turn, to shaping the 
contrasting ways in which the strengthening of challenger parties focusing on new politics 
issues has led to a redefinition of political cleavages and patterns of political competition at 
both national and regional levels. Scantamburlo, Alonso and Gómez (2018) suggest that the 
increasing relevance of democratic regeneration campaigns constitute a challenge for 
established regionalist parties (including the LN and CDC/CiU), which need to further 
diversify their political platform and take into account issues that relate to the improvement 
and transparency of democratic processes. The emergence of a new politics conflict dimension 
may in turn lead to declining relative importance of competition based on the traditional centre-
periphery cleavage. This is particularly true if new (and successful) challenger parties do not 
pay particular attention to territorial politics, as in the case of the M5S. In Spain, however, the 
new parties have linked their political agenda in part to the unresolved territorial question, 




The two main new parties in Spain that emerged in the wake of the financial crisis, Ciudadanos6 
and Podemos, positioned themselves further to the extremes of the territorial cleavage than the 
PP and PSOE, respectively. While Ciudadanos criticised the PP for not taking an even tougher 
line and action on Catalan secessionist actors, Podemos became the first state-wide party ever 
to have supported the ‘right to decide’ (in other words, self-determination) of Spain’s 
constituent regions. On the right, this resulted in an outbidding process between the PP and 
Ciudadanos – later also involving Vox from 2018 – as to who would ‘crack down’ the hardest 
on the Catalan independence movement, thereby increasing further the salience of the territorial 
dimension of competition.  
The new parties in Spain contributed to keeping centre-periphery issues high on the political 
agenda, much more than the M5S in Italy. The left side of Figure 4 shows manifesto data on 
how salient the centre-periphery cleavage is for Podemos and Ciudadanos in the Catalan 
context and for the new Italian party in the three main regions of northern Italy: Lombardy, 
Veneto, Piedmont. We refer to the centre-periphery dimension described in the codebook of 
the Regional Manifesto Project (Gomez, Alonso and Cabeza 2018). The right side of Figure 4 
focuses on the position of the three parties: positive scores meaning support for more 
decentralisation, negative scores meaning support for centralisation. Again, Ciudadanos and 




Responses to bad regional governance have also been markedly different in the two countries. 
In Italy, one aspect that contributed to the rise of the M5S and its decision to de-prioritise the 
territorial dimension was precisely the crisis of legitimacy faced by Italian regional institutions, 
increasingly associated with a rather corrupt political class (Cerruto, 2013). After the crisis, 
almost all regional councils were involved in expenses scandals. The LN itself was involved in 
party funding scandals, one of which even involved Umberto Bossi, leader of the party for 
more than two decades, and forced him to resign in 2012. A Demos survey published at the 
end of 2014 showed that since 2010, Italians’ support for regional institutions had dropped 
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from 33% to 19%.7  In this context the regionalist agenda of the LN became considerably less 
appealing. Interestingly, the constitutional reform promoted by the government led by centre-
left leader Matteo Renzi (2014–2016) was aimed at addressing some of the dysfunctionalities 
associated with the post-2001 regionalised system. This was done by promoting ‘a considerable 
rebalancing of power in favour of the central state’ and marking ‘a clear U-turn with respect to 
the federalist ideals that had accompanied the birth of the Second Republic’ (Ceccarini and 
Bordignon 2017: 285). Yet this attempt to recentralise power, which was rejected by Italian 
voters in the 2016 constitutional referendum, did not contribute to an awakening of territorial 
competition and a ‘systemic’ re-politicisation of the centre-periphery cleavage. The role of 
regions in the new constitutional setting was not a central issue in the campaign leading to the 
referendum, which was mainly focused on support or opposition to the Renzi government 
(Ibid.: 295). The front rejecting the reform was very heterogeneous including the M5S, the 
League, Berlusconi’s party and the extreme left, which were just united by their hostility to 
Renzi and lacked a common view on his re-centralisation plans (Vampa and Vignati 2017). 
In Spain, the reaction to the corruption that surfaced among regional political elites, many of 
whom were found to have had far too cosy a relationship with the regional savings banks and 
construction firms, was quite different. The corruption uncovered at regional government level 
in several autonomous communities was, by and large, committed by regional representatives 
of the state-wide parties and therefore became part and parcel of the corruption scandals 
engulfing the PP in general, and to a lesser extent the PSOE, rather than a specifically regional 
phenomenon. In turn, the anti-corruption stance adopted by the new parties was against the 
corruption of the longstanding parties at all government levels. CDC/CiU found itself in a 
difficult predicament since it too found itself tainted as one of the ‘old’ parties embroiled in 
corruption scandals, noticeably surrounding Jordi Pujol, former Catalan regional president for 
CDC/CiU from 1980-2003, and other CDC affiliates of that era. This was one among several 
factors that pushed CDC to speed up its rebranding of itself as a new pro-independence party 
under a new leadership (see Stage 3) and to distance itself from the centre-right Pujolist Catalan 
nationalism of the past, at a time when left-wing pro-independence forces were rapidly gaining 
popularity.  
Of course, back in Italy, regional identities and pro-autonomy movements did not completely 
disappear in the heartland of LN support. For instance, in 2014 autonomous regional groups 
                                                          




staged a referendum on Venetian independence. This vote was unconstitutional and was 
organised in an informal way. Although, due to the unconventional nature of the vote, no 
official data are available, the organisers claimed that turnout was very high (73.4 percent of 
eligible voters – much higher than in the 2017 Catalan independence referendum) and there 
was a plebiscitary support for independence (89 percent). According to some opinion polls, the 
majority of voters from all political parties supported independence.8 Following this first 
territorial mobilisation, in 2017 the regional governments of Veneto and Lombardy, led by the 
League, organised referendums – these were constitutionally legitimate – consulting citizens 
on their support for more autonomy. Both referendums returned overwhelming majorities 
(above 90%) in favour of transferring more powers to the regions. Yet far from revitalising the 
centre-periphery cleavage, these initiatives just showed that there was a broad consensus in 
favour of autonomy since none of the state-wide parties (including the M5S) campaigned 
against the referendum (Giovannini and Vampa 2019).9  The success of the referendums was 
not used as an opportunity to advance meaningful institutional reforms in the immediate 
aftermath of the vote and was not even exploited as a central political issue in the general 
election campaign a few months later. This is in stark contrast to Catalonia, where partisan 
divisions over the national and territorial question were exacerbated by the Catalan 
independence referendum in 2017 (and various attempts at citizen consultation beforehand). 
Therefore, even similar episodes, like regional referendums (but also the corruption scandals 
involving both LN and CDC), were not accompanied by comparable shifts in the territorial 
positions of the two parties. This is because, ultimately, the leaders of the two forces responded 
to the political crises affecting their respective countries (and regions) in different ways, as 
illustrated in the next section.  
 
Stage 3. Beyond structural factors: leaders and intra-party dynamics  
When Matteo Salvini became leader of the LN at the end of 2013 he inherited a significantly 
weakened organisational structure, which was more regionally concentrated than it had ever 
been in the previous two decades. The party received only 4% of the vote at the national level 
(back to its minimum since the early 2000s), even though it controlled the governments of the 
three main regions of the North: Lombardy, Veneto and Piedmont. Salvini’s maiden speech as 
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leader at the LN conference in December 2013 was under a banner that read ‘The Future is 
Independence’ (Albertazzi, Giovannini and Seddone 2018: 649). Therefore, there was no sign 
that the party was moving away from its territorially focused political platform. 
Yet within two years Salvini would radically reshape the political identity of the party and put 
aside the core regionalist character of the LN. Albertazzi, Giovannini and Seddone (2018) 
empirically show that in his political communication on social media, Salvini (but also the 
party organisation as a whole, which followed the leader) gradually de-emphasised the 
importance of themes linked to the traditional territorial focus of the party. Messages that 
resonated well beyond the North were instead privileged by the leadership. This shift in 
communication reflected a deeper ideological and organisational transformation of the party, 
which by the end of 2018, had resulted in the almost complete abandonment of a federalist, not 
to mention pro-independence, agenda. 
In Catalonia, it was the year 2012 that marked a clear turning point in CDC’s strategy away 
from the decades of accommodationist politics, as the then party leader Artur Mas explicitly 
started to advocate that the way forward for Catalonia involved achieving political sovereignty 
and some degree of statehood (the terminology used at this stage was still deliberately 
ambiguous to embrace options short of full independence too). CDC/CiU then formed an 
alliance in the Catalan parliament with a pro-independence party (the Republican Left, ERC) 
for the first time with the goal of working towards a referendum. Thereafter, CDC’s 
commitment to an independence agenda became firmer, resulting in 2015 in the break-up of 
CiU when the Democratic Union of Catalonia (UDC) – the smaller partner in the federation – 
did not support CDC’s new independentism and party alliances.  
Why did these shifts in territorial agenda happen? In Stage 2 we highlighted that the changing 
political environment resulted from the crisis might have ‘forced’ the two parties to reconsider 
their position on the territorial dimension. Yet external political factors would have not been 
sufficient to push the League away from its core programmatic stance, or to push CDC away 
from its traditional accommodationist practices. Internal party factors also help us explain the 
parties’ transformation.  
The agency of the new LN leader, Salvini, should not be underestimated. Indeed, changing the 
identity of the party was instrumental to the establishment of his new leadership within a party 




Most of Bossi’s (former) loyalists could still rely on personal support and power positions in 
the northern regions of Italy and would continue to act as an important constraint to the new 
leadership. Expanding the territorial base of the party by involving constituencies in regions 
outside the North was therefore a necessary step which would allow Salvini to establish and 
consolidate his role. It is not a coincidence that his nationalisation strategy was accompanied 
by the creation of a parallel political list, to be presented in the southern regions, called Noi con 
Salvini (Us with Salvini) (Vercesi 2016: 400). The name and platform of the new ‘sister party’ 
highlighted the centrality of the leader in the process of territorial expansion and ideological 
transformation. In northern Italy, Salvini still had to accommodate the demands coming from 
well-established regional leaders, such as the Presidents of the Lombardy and Veneto regions. 
But in the South, Salvini had the opportunity to create a movement that was fully dependent 
on his leadership and reflective of his populist views. This was also possible because in the 
southern regions the League had never had a governing role (Vampa 2017: 36). 
Salvini was also successful in promoting the transformation of the League because the party 
had already started paying increasing attention to themes that went well beyond its original 
regionalist mission. Within a clearly populist framework, the territorial agenda of the party was 
also combined with support for ‘law and order’ and anti-immigration policies. Generally, it 
seems that the ‘us versus them’ discourse of the LN changed over time. In the 1990s, when the 
main ‘enemies’ were the southern Italians, who were accused of ‘exploiting’ the northerners, 
the definitions of both ‘us’ (the northerners) and ‘them’ (the southerners) were clear and 
consistent with the territorial agenda of the party. In the 2000s, however, the increasing 
emphasis on immigration complicated the picture. The new ‘them’ was clearly represented by 
immigrants (from outside Italy) but also by EU institutions. At the same time, political attacks 
against southerners (and the political elite in Rome) became much rarer. Yet the party definition 
of ‘us’ remained more ambiguous and open to different interpretations. Was the party still 
defending and representing the exclusive interests of the Northerners? Was it instead promoting 
policies that could potentially appeal to all Italians?  
Figure 5 is based on data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (Volkens et al. 2018; see 
also discussion of Figure 1). The data consider changes in various categories from the 1990s 
to 2000s.10 It clearly shows how the programmatic profile of the LN had already started to 
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change from the 1990s to the 2000s. The declining role of the ‘federalist’ agenda is evident, as 
was also highlighted at the beginning of this article (Figure 1). Interestingly, this shift was 
accompanied by an increasing relevance of more anti-immigrant, law and order positions, 
which in the 2010s became clearly dominant. Additionally, the pro-European stance of the 
party disappeared in the 2000s (Chari et al 2004; Giordano 2004) and turned into clear 
Euroscepticism (negative score) in the 2010s.  
[Figure 5] 
In the 2000s, the programmatic transformation and differentiation of the LN, its more marked 
anti-immigration and ‘authoritarian’ profile (Mudde 2007: 22-23), did not initially seem to 
threaten the core regionalist identity of the party and in fact was ‘subsumed’ into it (Elias, 
Szöcsik and Zuber 2015: 845). For more than 20 years, Bossi and his political history 
symbolised long-term aspirations for more regional autonomy, which were never 
fundamentally questioned by leadership, activists and supporters. The ‘northern question’ 
remained central for the party with important effects on the whole political and institutional 
system of Italy (Fargion 2005). Yet at the beginning of the 21st century, some elements of 
tension and ambiguity started to emerge: how is ‘us’ defined and translated into political 
actions if immigrants and non-Italian actors (rather than the southerners) are the main 
‘enemies’, the new ‘them’? In the stormy years that followed the downfall of the old leader, 
this question assumed increasing relevance and allowed Salvini to respond to the structural 
changes described in Stage 2 by transforming the party into a state-wide, nationalist force. 
Generally, we cannot fully understand the territorial shift of the League just by looking at 
changes in the political context, without considering how the party and its leaders re-interpreted 
other (initially) ‘complementary’ issues and how these assumed increasing importance over 
time.  
The pre-crisis trajectory of CDC/CiU was different from the one followed by the League and 
this can help us refine the explanation of why, after the beginning of the crisis, this party has 
moved to more extreme territorial positions. As shown in Figure 6, which relies on the same 
manifesto categories considered in Figure 5, in the 1990s the political profile of CiU was very 
similar to the one of the League, not only on the centre-periphery dimension. Yet as its 
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territorial focus increased in the 2000s and 2010s, the party did not clearly shift to the right (at 
least not as much as the League) on immigration and EU/international issues, in keeping with 




The beginnings of an evolution within CDC in the years prior to the 2007 financial crisis is 
essential to understanding CDC’s eventual shift to a pro-sovereignty agenda in 2012. 
Moreover, the agency of Artur Mas himself is of particular importance in this regard. Like 
Salvini, who had to deal with the legacy of a strong former leader (Umberto Bossi), Mas was 
the successor of a prominent political personality, Jordi Pujol, who had dominated the party 
(and the Catalonian scene) for a very long period. Although the leadership change from Pujol 
to Mas was, at first, characterised by a continuation of moderate, accommodationist behaviour, 
Mas was well aware that the context in Catalonia was changing and CDC’s electoral base was 
diminishing. His subsequent decision to take the party in a new direction can also be seen, to 
an extent, as part of an ‘internal’ strategy aimed at consolidating his new position and gaining 
political legitimacy in that changing context. The unexpectedly high participation in the 2012 
pro-independence march on Catalan’s national day, amid increasing pressure from highly 
organised pro-independence civil society groups with close links to the political class, may 
well have accelerated Mas’s transformation of CDC into an explicitly pro-sovereignty party 
thereafter. And yet the seeds of this had in fact been in the making for a while. The shift can 
be seen as the culmination of the process of moving towards a ‘national transition’, a project 
Mas had started working on around 2006/2007 (Hugh 2014), when CiU was, for the first time, 
in opposition to a left-wing tripartite coalition governing Catalonia. Barrio and Rodríguez-
Teruel (2017) interpret CiU’s repeated attempts to outbid the ruling coalition – which also 
included the more territorially radical ERC – with more ambitious proposals of autonomy as 
an elite-led process of radicalisation in response to a climate of increasing party competition 
on the territorial axis. 
In 2007, Mas had announced a relaunch of the Fundació Catalanista Demòcrata Trias Fargas 
(CatDem), a foundation linked to CDC, with the aim to turn it into the ‘casa grande del 
catalanismo’ (‘big home for Catalanism’). Aware that CDC’s electoral base was diminishing 




party’s social base and recover voters disenchanted with years of CiU-PP collaboration.11 This 
coincided with a time of generational change within CDC, with pro-sovereignty sectors of the 
party’s youth organisation coming through the ranks. Mas wanted the ‘casa’ to bring together 
all those in politics and civil society interested in working on Catalonia’s future, from those in 
favour of more self-government through to those in favour of full independence. After the 
experience of being forced into the backseat when the tripartite coalition took forward plans 
for a new Catalan statute of autonomy, CDC was determined to be prepared to play the lead 
role in taking forward a national and territorial agenda for Catalonia the next time the 
opportunity arose.  
Moreover, the statute reform process itself had suggested that the viability of traditional 
accommodationist politics to seek gains for Catalonia was coming to an end. Many powers had 
already been devolved to the region, and not only the PP, but also many within the PSOE, were 
starting to feel that the devolution model had gone far enough. When CiU returned to power in 
Catalonia in 2010, forming a minority government, it did initially re-establish a working 
relationship with the PP, relying upon its support in the Catalan parliament to approve some 
fundamental areas of legislation, for example its 2012 regional budget. This relationship with 
the PP was, however, by then a very uncomfortable one for CiU, and eventually became 
untenable following the PP’s winning of an absolute majority in the Spanish parliament in 2011 
and its implementation of an austerity agenda, crackdown on regional spending and attempts 
at recentralisation from then onwards.12 The time was ripe for a more dramatic shift in CDC’s 
agenda.  
CDC under Mas thus gradually evolved towards a pro-sovereignty stance in a step-by-step 
process, moving on to a new phase each time one was thwarted by Madrid: first the idea of a 
bilateral financing pact specifically for Catalonia, then the ‘right to decide’, then ‘state 
structures’ (with ambiguity intended, leaving open the possibility at first of whether or not this 
would imply full independence from Spain or an alternative arrangement within Spain), and 
finally an explicit pro-independence agenda. Following Mas’s replacement as president by 
Carles Puigdemont (a longstanding committed pro-independence figure), the identity of the 
party, rebranded as the Catalan European Democratic Party (PDeCAT), was somewhat 
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obscured by the rather ambiguous nature of the exact relationship between the party itself and 
the broader pro-independence platforms that Puigdemont spearheaded. First there was Junts 
per Catalunya (Together for Catalonia), comprising PDeCAT but also independents, created 
to contest the 2017 Catalan election. Puigdemont and his successor Quim Torra then launched 
another new platform in 2018, the Crida Nacional per la República (National Call for the 
Republic), the aim of which was to become an all-encompassing pro-independence movement 
bringing together different pro-independence parties and independents, regardless of their 
exact partisan affiliation. While the creation of the Crida risked diluting PDeCAT’s own 
identity, still fledgling after the party’s rebranding, it is interesting that this attempt to build an 
all-encompassing pro-sovereignty movement bears a marked parallel with the idea of creating 
a pan-Catalanist organisation that Mas had more than a decade previously when he set up the 
‘casa grande del catalanismo’.13 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Our comparative analysis started with a general description of the diverging territorial positions 
of two regionalist parties, the LN and CDC. Since the Great Recession, the latter has shifted to 
the extreme end of the centre-periphery dimension of political competition, whereas the former 
has almost completely abandoned its territorial agenda. We have analysed the process that led 
to this divergence, first looking at changes in the socio-economic context at the national and 
regional levels (stage 1) and then focusing on the impact that the crisis had on political 
opportunity structures (stage 2). We have also considered how new leaders responded to deep 
transformations in the political environment by accelerating intra-party processes of 
programmatic revision that had already started before the crisis (stage 3).  
Table 1 summarises our findings. We have highlighted that the economic crisis was severe in 
both Italy and Spain but only in the latter did it contribute to a significant increase in the 
tensions between central and regional governments, particularly in Catalonia, one of the 
historic regions facing the greatest financial problems under the common financing system. 
This also shaped the process of party system restructuring. Whereas in Italy the new political 
challenger that emerged from the crisis, the M5S, neglected territorial issues, in Spain the two 
outsiders, Podemos and Ciudadanos, positioned themselves on the opposite sides of the centre-
                                                          





region conflict. This in turn affected the process of adaptation already being undertaken by the 
two key regionalist parties: the League in Italy and CDC in Spain. The change in political 
opportunity structures at national and subnational levels interacted with intra-party 
developments. In Italy, the new leader of the League, Matteo Salvini, dropped the federalist 
agenda and actively promoted the nationalisation of the party, pushing to the extreme the 
radical right-wing character of the party (focusing more on anti-immigration and anti-EU 
policies than decentralisation), which had already started to emerge in the early 2000s. In Spain, 
on the other hand, Artur Mas was under increasing pressure to abandon moderate pro-federalist 




Yet these shifts were not merely passive adjustments to changing external circumstances in the 
wake of the financial crisis. As our analysis has shown, Salvini refused to re-politicise the 
centre-periphery cleavage even after regional branches of his own party organised autonomy 
referendums in Lombardy and Veneto and a civil society movement in the latter region 
mobilised in support of independence. On the other hand, Mas had already started reshaping 
some important elements of CDC’s territorial agenda in the pre-crisis period due to a 
combination of internal and external pressures. This facilitated the party’s move to the pro-
independence camp once the Great Recession had seriously altered political equilibriums and 
central-regional relations. Mas’s successors further consolidated CDC’s programmatic 
transformation. Therefore, while transformations in the political environment are important – 
the changes observed in this paper would not have occurred in a context of stability –, they are 
not sufficient in explaining how parties shift their emphasis and position on specific policy 
dimensions – the territorial one in this specific case. Ultimately, political ‘entrepreneurs’ act as 
agents of change by relying on past legacies and exploiting a selected mix of intra-party and 
external conditions during a ‘critical juncture’.  
Although here we have tried to explain why the two parties followed different paths, it is 
undeniable that their transformations in turn had important effects on central-periphery political 
dynamics at the system-wide level in Italy and Spain. Going back to our framework 




feedback effects on the political context. So, for instance, the radicalisation of CDC resulted in 
a hardening of the recentralising drive advocated not only by the mainstream PP but also, and 
particularly, the emerging Ciudadanos. From 2018, the worsening of centre-periphery tensions 
even contributed to the emergence of a new right-wing party, Vox. This party negates other 
nationalities and regional identities in Spain and primarily mobilises against centrifugal 
territorial tendencies coming from regions pushing for more autonomy or independence, 
Catalonia being the main target (Vampa 2020). More generally, competition in the Spanish 
general elections of April and November 2019 was heavily shaped by how all parties positioned 
themselves on the centre-periphery dimension (Gray 2020). On the other hand, the territorial 
moderation of the League, and its simultaneous radicalisation on the libertarian-authoritarian 
dimension (and on the EU ‘transnational’ cleavage), has contributed to the further decline of 
territorial issues in the Italian political debate. Thus, immigration (linked to the refugee crisis), 
taxation (introduction of a flat-tax) and social policy (introduction of a basic income) were the 
dominant issues of the 2018 general election campaign (Chiaramonte et al. 2018; Baldini and 
Nels Giglioli 2019). Even potentially disruptive episodes, like the autonomy referendums in 
Veneto and Lombardy mentioned above, failed to gain significant national attention 
(comparable to that of the Catalan crisis in Spain). If anything, the increasing ‘nationalisation’ 
of Italian political competition seems to be favouring the success of another radical right party, 
Brothers of Italy (FdI), which, together with Salvini’s League, forms the Italian ‘sovereignist’ 
front (Basile and Mazzoleni 2020).   
The scope of this comparative article is limited to two parties in two countries in the decade 
following the crisis. Yet its framework can be applied to other parties and country cases and to 
the analysis of future developments beyond the period considered. In Spain itself, while we 
have focused here on CDC as the largest regionalist party since the transition to democracy and 
therefore the most significant for wider territorial dynamics, the same framework can also be 
applied to explain why its closest equivalent in the Basque region, the Basque Nationalist Party 
(PNV), did not radicalise towards a pro-independence stance in the same way but rather 
postponed its quest for some degree of sovereignty for the Basque Country in the aftermath of 
the 2008 financial crisis (Gray 2020). Given the different nature of both the economic and fiscal 
model in the Basque Country, the impact of the financial crisis was not as hard on the region, 
and it was also the regional government’s responsibility to address it (no scope to blame the 
central government under the model of near fiscal autonomy). The region also experienced 




trends specific to the region, that help to explain the different trajectory of the PNV compared 
to CDC. 
Returning to the parties analysed in this paper, the divergence observed in 2008-2018 between 
the League and CDC (and its successors) could increase or decrease depending on changes in 
socio-economic and political contexts and on the strategies pursued by key political players in 
response to these changes. Systemic shocks in other countries might also lead to shifts in one 
direction or the other, similar to those of Italy or Spain, depending on context and actors. So, 
for instance, Brexit could lead to a repositioning of political parties on the centre-periphery 
dimension in the UK, with the re-emergence of pro-independence demands in Scotland, which 
the 2014 referendum seemed to have defused. Yet neither the Great Recession nor Brexit have 
been as disruptive as the shock that the whole world is currently facing. The crisis caused by 
the COVID-19 pandemic is once again hitting Italy and Spain particularly hard. It is too soon 
to provide an analysis of current developments but this critical juncture is likely to deeply affect 
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Figure 1. Party manifestos: diverging positions on federalism/decentralisation from 1990s to 
2010s  
 
Source: comparative manifesto project. Authors’ own calculations based on the share of 
manifesto quasi-sentences supporting a move of authority from the centre to the periphery. 
2010s election up to 2018 in Italy and 2016 in Spain (2019 data not available but CDC was 



























Figure 3. Deficit as % of Revenues in Spanish Autonomous Communities and Italian 
Regions: Averages Before (2000-2007) and After (2008-2015) the Crisis 
 
Sources: Intervención General de la Administración del Estado and Ministerio de Hacienda y 
Función Pública (for Spain); Agenzia per la Coesione Terrioriale and Istituto Nazionale di 





Figure 4. Centre-Periphery Cleavage: Saliency and Position of Ciudadanos and Podemos in 
Catalonia and M5S in Lombardy, Veneto and Piedmont 
 





Figure 5. The programmatic transformation of the LN: territorial politics, social 
conservatism, Europe 
 




Figure 6. The programmatic transformation of the CDC (CiU): territorial politics, social 
conservatism, Europe 
 
Source: Comparative Manifesto Project (up until 2016; 2019 data not available but CDC was 




Table 1. Summary. League and CDC: from similarity to divergence 
 
Parties Pre-crisis similar 
position 
Stage 1. Socio-economic 
context after 2008 
Stage 2. Political context after 
2008 
Stage 3. Political agency (party 
leadership) after 2008  
Post-crisis 
different 
outcome Similarities Differences Similarities Differences Similarities Differences 
League 
(Italy) 






















































Regionalist party Regional 
finances 
seriously 
affected. 
Tensions 
between 
Catalonia and 
central 
government 
New actors 
(Podemos, 
Ciudadanos) 
are clearly 
positioned on 
centre-
periphery 
cleavage 
Leader 
promotes 
radicalisation 
of territorial 
agenda 
Pro-
independence 
party 
 
 
 
 
